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ABSTRACT 
Soldiers maneuvering on the 21st Century battlefield are issued state-of-the-art 
equipment. Despite this, the tools at their disposal to identify targets as being a “friend” 
or a “foe” have changed little since Operation Desert Storm. While improved optics on 
late model combat systems are extending gunners’ abilities to identify targets at extended 
ranges, an optics-vs.-ballistics gap remains in the majority of U.S. Army ground 
maneuver forces. This gap, and other battlefield factors, increases the likelihood of 
fratricides in combat. 
This thesis examines the feasibility of using the Army’s Tactical Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) as a combat identification (CID) tool for troops at the tactical 
level. Three scenarios were modeled and multiple simulations run to identify potential 
problems in using the TUAV as a CID tool, as well as ways to improve the system if it is 
used in this role. Model considerations included current and planned future datalink 
bandwidths, system delays, normal vs. immediate taskings, and travel times to mission 
areas.  
The thesis demonstrates that if TUAVs are properly integrated into tactical 
mission planning and imagery analysts possess the necessary level of vehicle 
identification training (to include thermal identification training), the TUAV can function 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Iraq, February 27, 1991: In the hours of darkness preceding dawn, portions of two 
U.S. Army units made contact during the early stages of Desert Storm’s ground war. The 
result – one soldier dead and another wounded, both due to fratricide or “friendly fire”. 
The unit which fired, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, is known to be one of the 
finest ground combat forces in the world…well-trained, well-led, and always equipped 
with the most modern equipment available in Army inventories. Yet on the morning of 
27 February, this well-trained, well-led, well-equipped force positively identified Iraqi 
forces to their front - that were in actuality another U.S. force – and engaged them [Ref. 
1]. Now, as in 1991, the vast majority of Army forces lack the tools necessary for tactical 
troops to make combat identification (CID) decisions – that is, the ability to look at a 
detected target and positively identify it as friendly or hostile. 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the Army’s Shadow 200 Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV), the first variant in new series of UAVs the Army is 
fielding, is a viable tool to aid the tactical (Brigade and below) commander in performing 
CID on today’s battlefield. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The overall value of the Shadow 200 system in providing combat identification to 
Brigade-level commanders can be decomposed into the following research questions: 
 
(1) Does the Shadow 200’s thermal resolution permit operator detection and 
resolution from threshold survivable stand off range? 
(2) How many CID-supporting missions can a Shadow 200 perform during a full 
operational window of four hours? How many in an immediate tasking mission? 
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 (3) What factors need to be considered in order to properly model the TUAV 
system as a CID tool? 
 
(4) What are the results of modeling TUAV operational timelines in the CID 
process when cued by J-STARS? 
 
(5) How large a role does imagery analyst vehicle identification training play in 
determining the success of using TUAV’s as a CID tool? 
 
(6) What impact does the TUAV operator “man in the loop” have on the CID 
process? Are there ways to reduce this impact? 
C. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THIS THESIS 
The conclusions and recommendations of this thesis are expected to aid tactical 
commanders in deciding whether the TUAV is appropriate for use in their CID processes 
and if so, some ways to improve the TUAV systems ability to function as a CID tool. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. FRATRICIDE 
Fratricide is defined as the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with 
the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities, which results in 
unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel [Ref. 2]. During the 
Gulf War in 1991, 24 percent of Americans killed in action –35 of 146 – died at the 
hands of other U.S. forces. Similarly, 15 percent of those wounded – 72 of 467 – were 
victims of “friendly fire” [Ref. 3]. This results in an overall fratricide rate of 17 percent. 
Of these fratricides, 61 percent resulted during ground-to-ground  engagements [Ref. 4]. 
Why does fratricide occur most frequently on the ground? One reason is that the 
battlefield is “dirtier” than the other combat arenas, such as the air – no Interrogate 
Friend or Foe (IFF) such as our military aircraft have to differentiate friendly elements 
from enemy, no radar or acoustic profiles, sporadic communications much of the time, a 
much larger number of entities to keep track of, etc. Add to this that our mechanized 
forces’ ballistic capabilities far exceed their associated optical capabilities – i.e., we can 
shoot farther than we can see – and it becomes clear why ground fratricide numbers are 
higher. This is particularly true in mechanized units, where targeting and weapons 
systems continue to improve in lethality and range.  
Some of the newer systems being fielded will reduce the number of fratricides, 
such as the Second Generation Forward Looking Infrared (2nd Gen FLIR) sight used by 
the M1A2-SEP main battle tank and the M2A3/M3A3 Bradleys. The 2nd Gen FLIR is a 
fully integrated engagement-sighting system designed to provide the gunner and tank 
commander with significantly improved day and night target acquisition and engagement 
capability. The system allows 70 percent better acquisition, 45 percent quicker firing and 
greater accuracy, and a gain of 30 percent in range for target acquisition and 
identification [Ref. 5]. Unfortunately fielding of the M1A2-SEPs is only just beginning, 
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so at present most of the Army’s heavy tanks still rely on the older thermal imaging 
systems. Additionally, current planning for the Army Transformation “Legacy Force” 
calls for half of the tanks to be digitized M1A1s – just over 1,500 of these remodeled 
M1A1s total. That means the troops manning these systems will for the most part be 
dealing with the M1A1s older technology, but will be able to communicate with the 
digital systems of more modern combat platforms. The Army’s intent is to upgrade these 
M1A1-Digital (M1A1D) tanks with 2nd Generation FLIR, but as of now the funding is 
not there. Finally, the pre-positioned stocks of tanks and fighting vehicles, such as those 
on station in Kuwait and Qatar for Middle East contingency operations, all utilize earlier 
generation optics – the same optics used during Desert Storm in 1991. 
B. COMBAT IDENTIFICATION (CID) 
1. CID Defined 
The Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team (JCIET), a joint command 
under United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) aimed at fostering improved 
joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) across all CID mission areas, defines 
CID as “a process that results in a shooter determining a target’s identification in support 
of an engagement decision under specified Rules of Engagement (ROE)” [Ref. 6]. 
Accurate combat engagement is not only a question of identifying what type of 
equipment we are looking at, but also being able to ascertain whether the target is 
friendly, enemy, or neutral in order to make an engagement decision. 
 
2. Current CID Efforts 
Various systems and efforts are underway to deal with ground-to-ground CID 
issues. The Army’s proponent for CID is Program Manager Combat Identification (PM 





a. Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) 
BCIS uses directional, millimeter wave technology to provide positive 
identification of BCIS-equipped equipment on the battlefield. It is a “pointing” fratricide-
prevention system. The potential shooter aims his weapon at the target and “queries” it. 
The interrogation will let him know that the target is friendly so long as the “target” is 
also mounting a BCIS system. The drawback is obvious. Vehicles lacking BCIS or with 
an  inoperative BCIS system could be friendly or neutral. The BCIS “shooter” does not 
have a clear picture of what he is facing. The risk is that one of two things can happen: 
first, he might shoot a non-hostile player; second, erring to the side of caution and not 
engaging, the friendly “shooter” is engaged by what turned out to be an enemy system. 
 
b. Combat Identification for the Dismounted Soldier (CIDDS) 
CIDDS is a secure laser interrogation and radio frequency response 
system that will be used by dismounted infantry to positively identify dismounted 
friendly troops. Like BCIS, it will only identify other friendlies using operational CIDDS 
equipment. 
 
c. Quick Fix Devices 
Quick Fix Devices are designed to give the shooter a visual indication of 
friendly platforms or dismounts. They fall into three varieties: near-infrared Budd and 
Phoenix Lights and thermal Combat Identification Panels (CIPs). Like the name states, 
these systems were designed as a “quick fixes” after Desert Storm to prevent friendly 
casualties until more permanent systems such as BCIS and CIDDS came on line. 
 
d. Improving Situational Awareness (SA) 
Improving SA means increasing shooters’ awareness of what is happening 
on the battlefield around them. This can be accomplished through SA systems that 
provide crewmembers additional information about known friendly and enemy positions 
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on the battlefield or simply by making sure that all personnel have updated graphics and 
are kept informed of the friendly and enemy situations through radio transmissions. 
3. Thesis CID Focus 
Combat identification is critical for all mission areas  - Ground to Ground, 
Ground to Air, Air to Ground, and Air to Air. This paper, however, will look at the 
process only from the Ground-to-Ground perspective, as this is where the TUAVs 
viability in CID comes into play. 
 
 C. THE TACTICAL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (TUAV) 
 
The TUAV program acquires a system of complementary Tactical UAVs that 
provide operational and tactical commanders near-real time, highly accurate, sustainable 
capabilities for over the horizon/hill reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and 
battle damage assessment. The program will support Army Corps/Division/Brigades, USMC 
MEFs and Navy Amphibious Assault Groups. The first in this new generation of TUAVs 
will be the Shadow 200, designed specifically for the tactical commander. The Initial 
Operation Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) program began in May 2001. 
The Shadow 200 is designed to be the Brigade Commander’s UAV, allowing him 
to gain dominant situational awareness of his battlespace. It will be a key component of 
the Brigade’s collection package, giving commanders the ability to “see” into areas that 
ground reconnaissance elements cannot penetrate or move to in a timely manner and can 
also provide “eyes” on heavily protected areas where commanders do not wish to send 
manned aerial platforms. The TUAV can be linked to and cued by wide area sensors such 
as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Guardrail Common 
Sensor (GRCS), Artillery Counter Mortar/Battery Radars and Forward Area Air Defense 
Command and Control (FAAD C2).  
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 1. Shadow 200 System Overview 
The Shadow 200 TUAV system consists of five basic components: the Ground 
Control Stations (GCS) and related equipment, the Air Vehicles (AV), the Modular  
Mission Payloads (MMP), the Remote Video Terminals (RVT), and communications. A 
TUAV system will include four AVs, three for mission execution plus one spare, and will 
be able to provide 12 hours of coverage within a 24-hour period. For no more than three 
consecutive days the system can provide 18 hours of coverage per 24-hour period. Full 
manning of a system requires a crew of 22 personnel for operation and maintenance at 
the described operational tempo (OPTEMPO).  
The system is designed for ease of use, operation, recovery, and maintenance. It 
presents a small profile in order to reduce its footprint on the battlefield, aid in rapid 
deployability/set-up/teardown, and to reduce impact on the Brigade’s combat service 
support (CSS) resources. 
 
2. System Components 
 
a. Ground Control Stations (GCS) 
The GCS and its related equipment perform two primary functions. First, 
it is the primary means of operating, controlling, and tracking the AV. The GCS’s second 
primary function is to manipulate the payload and receive/process telemetry and video 
downlinks. Additionally, it incorporates mission-planning functions that allow call for 
and adjustment of indirect fires. 
There are two GCSs per TUAV system, each in a HMMWV mounted 
command and control (C2) shelter (Figs. 1 and 2). The GCS has two operators - an Air 
Vehicle Operator (AVO) and a Mission Payload Operator (MPO). 
 Each GCS can only communicate with and control one AV at a time. A 
normal mission would see a GCS at the Launch and Recovery (L/R) site handle getting 
the birds airborne. Once in the air, it will pass off the AV to the other GCS for mission 
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execution while it prepares another Shadow for launch. Once the mission is complete, the 
GCSs could again switch AVs, with the L/R site handing off a fresh AV to its sister GCS 











































Figure 2. Ground Control Station (GCS) – Interior View [From: Ref. 7] 
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b. Air Vehicles (AV) 
The Shadow 200 is a mid-wing monoplane with a twin boom empennage 
supporting an inverted-V tail (Fig. 3). Constructed of composite materials and powered 
by a rotary engine, the AV has an endurance of four hours on station at 50 kilometers 
from the L/R site [Ref. 8]. A clear line of site is required between the AV and the Ground 














Figure 3. Shadow 200 AV [From: Ref. 7] 
 
Due to its small size and composite materials, the AV is not visually 
detectable from ranges exceeding 4,000 feet and is not audible from ranges exceeding 
2,000 feet. It can operate in less than ideal weather conditions flying at altitudes of 
14,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) or greater, while its nominal operating 
altitudes/survivable altitudes are from 8,000 to 10,000 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) 





Altitude:   Maximum (km,ft) 
Operating  (km,ft) 
4.6km                     14,000ft 
1.8 – 3.7km            6,000 – 12,000 ft 
Endurance (Max):         (hrs)    5 hrs* 
Radius of Action:     (km,nm)  50 km*                       31 nm* 
Speed:      Maximum (km/hr,kts) 
Cruise       (km/hr,kts) 
Loiter        (km/hr,kts) 
200 km/hr               105 kts 
120 – 130 km/hr        65 – 70 kts 
120 – 130 km/hr        65 – 70 kts 
Climb Rate (Max):    (m/min,fpm)  366 m/min                           1200 fpm 




Avionics:         Transponder 
Navigation 
Mode IIIC, IV (IFF) 
GPS 




Rail Launched (soccer field size) 
Arrested Recovery (soccer field size) 
Guidance & Control Remote Control/Preprogrammed/Autonomous 
Fuselage:         Length (m/ft) 
Width (m/ft) 
            3.4 m                         11 ft 
            4.0 m                         13 ft 
Wingspan:   (m/ft)             3.9 m                       12.8 ft 
Weight:   Max (kg/lbs) 
Payload   (kg/lbs) 
        147.6 kg                     328 lbs 
          27.3 kg                       60 lbs 
Fuel:   Type 
Capacity   (kg/lbs) 
MOGAS  
          23.1 kg                    50.7 lbs 
                    
*TUAV has demonstrated capability to exceed requirements 
 
Figure 4. Shadow 200 Specifications [From: Ref. 8] 
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 c. Modular Mission Payloads (MMP) 
The Shadow 200 payloads incorporate a modular design. The baseline 
sensor is the Electro-Optic / Infrared (EO/IR) payload (Fig.5). The secondary priority 
payload is a Synthetic Aperture Radar / Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) payload, 












Figure 5. EO/IR Payload [From: Ref. 7] 
 
The EO/IR payload is a multi-mode, Forward Looking Infrared / 
Television (FLIR/TV) sensor. The threshold (minimum) requirement of the system is to 
recognize an APC-sized target at operational altitudes of 8,000 feet AGL (day) and 6,000 
feet AGB (night).  Performance testing was conducted in both EO and IR modes of 
operation . The MMP performance in both modes exceeded requirements.  
In IR mode, which has three selectable fields of view, the requirement was 
for a 70 percent probability of detection of a 3.5 square meter (m2) target at 3.5 km slant 
range. The 70 percent probability was reached at 4.75 km (Figure 6). The probability of 






























0.7 @ 3.5 km requirement 
 
Figure 6. Measured IR Performance [From: Ref. 9] 
 
In EO mode, the requirement was for 80 percent probability detection at 
3.8 km. There was actually a 90 percent probability of recognition at the 3.8 km mark and 

































0.8 @ 3.8 km requirement
Figure 7. EO Measured Performance [From: Ref. 9] 
 
There is no automated target recognition system within the AV payload or 
at the GCS. This is true not only of the Shadow 200 system, but of all UAVs. All target 
recognition (what the target is) and identification (friend/foe/neutral) occurs at the 
operator level – someone looking at the live imagery downlinked to the GCS or a Remote 
Video Terminal (RVT). Training will be discussed in a in a later chapter dealing with 
conclusions and recommendations, but it is critical in the process. A soldier or Marine 
well-trained in target identification does not need the AV to fly as close to the target, or 
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remain on station as long, in order to make a target identification. This is particularly true 
at night. While the IR sensor often is able to pick up potential targets more readily 
through obscuration, foliage, etc., it is useful in the identification process to switch 
between normal and thermal imagery. During hours of darkness this is not an option, and 
the operators making identification decisions must be trained not only to know the 
physical characteristics of various vehicles, but also the thermal characteristics of the 
same vehicles. This is a much more difficult standard upon which to make a CID 















Figure 8. IR Imagery from EO/IR Payload [From: Ref. 7] 
 
d. Remote Video Terminals (RVT) 
Each Brigade’s TUAV system includes four RVTs, dispersed throughout 
the Brigade’s area of operations according to the commander’s wishes in order to best 
support his scheme of maneuver. The RVT (Fig. 9) is a portable, rugged system that 
receives, processes, and displays near real time (NRT) video images and telemetry from 
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the AV. The terminals receive video and telemetry signals from the AV through either 
the antenna or the GCS. When within 50 kilometers of the AV, an RVT can receive 
direct downlink from the Shadow 200 and display annotated imagery to the operator, 
store imagery, recall selected segments, and display near real time imagery with 
annotation to include date/time group, north seeking arrow, AV position and heading, 
and selectable target location when in the center field of view (in latitude/longitude, 














Figure 9. Remote Video Terminal (RVT) [From: Ref. 7] 
 
e. Ground Communications 
The Ground Control Station provides a ready interface to the existing 
secure command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) 
architecture. This includes the JSTARS Common Ground Station (CGS), the Advanced 
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the All Source Analyses System 
(ASAS), and Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2). 
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Intelligence reports from the GCS include secure voice, electronic 
dissemination, and/or video via the various communications systems in the GCS. Secure 
communications and intelligence dissemination are provided through the DoD tactical 
radios (VHF and UHF), Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), and the Tactical Local 
Area Network (TACLAN). 
Ground components use Service standard tactical communications 
equipment and procedures. TUAV communications must interface with selected standard 
DoD C4I systems, architectures, and protocols. All communications must be 
interoperable with National Security Agency (NSA) approved encryption systems. The 
system will have UHF communications capable of secure operations with Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) agencies and also with Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) 
and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft. It will be 
capable of relaying UHF communications through the AV. 
The tactical communications system will provide integrated 
communications to the TUAV tactical users for mission support and communication 
between shelters. Communications between shelter operators, external system users, and 
support units will be via Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 
(SINCGARS) radios. Telephones will be used for comms between the TUAV Control 
Shelters, Mobile Maintenance Facility, and system users. A tactical telephone capable of 
digital data and voice communications will be part of the TUAV system. Digital data will 
be translated to standard formats for use by shelter consoles. Two telephone networks 
will be in operation: MSE for telephone (voice/data) communication and one fiber optic 
net (Ethernet) for intra-shelter voice/data communication. Figure 10 depicts the GCS 
radio equipment and communication devices. 
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Figure 10. GCS Radios and Communications Devices [From: Ref. 8] 
 
3. Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) 
The TCDL program’s purpose is to develop a family of interoperable digital, 
secure, data links supporting both unmanned and manned airborne reconnaissance 
platforms [Ref. 10].  As applied to the Brigade’s TUAV system, it is the data link 
between the GCS and the AV. The TCDL will provide near real time connectivity and 
interoperability between multiple TCDL collection platforms (the TUAVs), TCDL 
surface terminals (the GCSs as well as the receive-only RVTs), and currently fielded 
Common Data Link (CDL) interoperable systems operated throughout the military and 
other government agencies. 
The TCDL provides a full-duplex, digital transmission between AV payloads and 
surface terminals through LOS transmissions.  The command link (the uplink between 
the GCS and the TUAV) will be at the current CDL data rate of 200 Kbps. The video 
downlink from the TUAV to the GCSs or RVTs is currently at 10.71 Mbps, with a 
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planned improvement in the near future to 45 Mbps. The uplink frequency operating 
range is in the 15.15 to 15.35 GHz band, and the downlink range is the 14.4 to 14.83 GHz 
band. The contractor requirement is for TCDL to be tunable in 5 MHz step sizes or less. 
The LOS slant range planning distance is 200 km at 15,000 feet AGL. 
The primary components of the TCDL are the Ground Data Terminal (GDT) and 
the Airborne Data Terminal (ADT). 
 
a. Ground Data Terminal (GDT) 
Located at the GCS, the GDT transmits command and control guidance to 
the AV and receives MPEG-2 video imagery transmitted from the AV (Fig. 11). 
 
b. Airborne Data Terminal (ADT) 
The ADT is located in the AV itself. It receives guidance instructions from 
the GDT located at the GCS and transmits imagery back to the GDT (Fig. 12). 
 











Figure 12. TCDL Airborne Data Terminal (ADT) [From: Ref. 11] 
 20
III.  MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter examines the feasibility of using the TUAV as a CID tool through 
the use of modeling and simulation. Three scenarios will be modeled and their processes 
examined to develop an understanding of the potential problems in using the TUAV 
system as a CID tool and improvements that can be made to enhance the system if it is 




 a. Modeling 
 A model is a logical description of how a system, process, or component 
behaves [Ref. 12]. Instead of interacting with a real system, we can create a model 
corresponding to certain aspects of the system. 
 
b. Simulation 
Simulation involves designing a model of a system and carrying out 
experiments on the model. The purpose of these experiments is to determine how the real 
system (being modeled) performs and to predict the effect of changes to the system as 
time progresses. 
 
2. Extend Modeling Software 
Extend software was used for the modeling and simulation. Extend is a dynamic, 
iconic simulation environment with a built-in development system for extensibility. It 
enables the user to simulate discrete event, continuous, and combined discrete 
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event/continuous processes and systems. Additionally, Extend allows users to build their 
own modules.  
Most systems can be modeled using Extend’s pre-built blocks, therefore no 
programming is necessary. The blocks are grouped into libraries according to function. 
The user places desired blocks in his model by selecting them from a drag-and-drop 
menu on the toolbar. Once selected, the blocks appear in the Extend desktop workspace. 
Block connections are made using a standard mouse. Block parameters are set through its 
dialogue box. Data can be entered directly into block dialogues, interactively using 
controls, or read in from files as the simulation runs. 
 
3. Modeling Considerations 
 
a. Description of the Process Being Modeled 
The model will simulate a process that begins with a wide area sensor’s 
(JSTARS) reception of moving target indicators (MTIs) and tracks the progress of the 
MTIs through the Brigade’s decision on a course of action (COA). The following steps 
take place in the simulation: 
 
• Data flows from the JSTARS platform to the JSTARS Common 
Ground Station (CGS) located at a Brigade Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC). 
 
• A decision-maker at the TOC (egs. Brigade Commander, Executive 
Officer, Operations Officer) decides how the Brigade will further 
develop the MTI item…i.e., what internal asset they will use to gain 
more intelligence on the MTI, or what outside agency they will request 




• The item is routed to the selected node for further development (if 
tasked to the TUAV, the item continues in the simulation; if not, the 
MTI exits the simulation). 
 
• The TUAV GCS has an AV prepared (if necessary) and sends mission 
commands to the AV on the TCDL. 
 
• The AV moves to the mission area and begins transmitting imagery to 
the GCS and the RVTs. 
 
• Decision-makers at the TOC decide on a COA after reviewing the 
imagery…i.e., shoot or don’t shoot. 
 
• The MTI item exits the simulation. 
 
 Other factors considered in order to make the model as realistic as 
possible are bandwidth limitations, preparation and travel time to get an AV into the 
mission area, the slant range of the AV when it detects the target, and the Brigade 
decision time to decide a COA.  
 A final note on the simulation. Many of the model’s attributes - video size, 
for example - are set early (before they would actually occur in the real world) in order to 
simplify the model. This is possible because Extend allows users to set attribute values at 
any point. It is often more economical to set attribute values for items as they are 
generated at the beginning of the simulation and then pull and measure the values at a 
later point in the simulation (when they would be occurring in the real world). 
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 b. Goal of Simulation 
To use the simulation as a process model for the utilization of the Shadow 
200 TUAV system as a CID tool and identify areas where the system can be improved if 
it is to serve in this role. 
 
 c. Design Basis 
 Keeping in mind that the question involved in this thesis is the feasibility 
of using the TUAV for CID purposes, the first step was to decide the type of model to 
build…discrete event, continuous, or a combination of the two. For the systems 
simulated, the data and information flow are event-driven. Based on this, discrete event 
models are used throughout. 
 
d. Design Steps 
The following process was used in designing the models: identify the 
nodes involved (JSTARS, Brigade TOC, TUAV system); examine the architecture of the 
nodes involved; replicate the overall system nodes and architecture using Extend 
modeling blocks and connections; set realistic parameters for the nodes; run the 
simulation; analyze the simulation results, focusing on whether an identification could be 
made by a trained operator (the AV is inside detection range and not within threshold 
survivable stand off range) and the delays occurring for preparation, uplink, travel, and 
downlink; make adjustments to parameters to answer further questions; analyze new 
results; repeat adjustments to the model as needed; draw conclusions based on the results. 
 
B.  SIMULATION PHASES 
 
 Figure 13 represents the entire model from MTI reception by a wide area sensor 































Figure 13. MTI Reception through CID Decision 
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 1. JSTARS 
Figure 14 illustrates what is occurring within the “JSTARS” hierarchical block. In 
the JSTARS block, MTI items are being produced at specified intervals by an Extend 
Generator block. After generation, several attributes are associated with the items as they 
are created: 
 
a. MTI MSG 
An Input Random Number block sets the MTI message size in megabits 
(Mb). The output will be a real number between two selected values. 
 
b. CGS MSG 
Another Input Random Number block, this one setting the size of the 
message traveling from the JSTARS CGS to the Brigade TOC (in Mb). The output will 
be a real number between two selected values. 
 
c. GCS OUT 
An Input Random Number block setting the size of the message being 
transmitted to the AV in Mb. The output will be a real number between two selected 
values. 
 
d. VID SIZE 
An Input Random Number block setting the size of the MPEG-2 video 
imagery (in Mb) being transmitted from the AV to the GCS. The output will be a real 



























An Input Random Number block used to select which node (type of firing 
unit) is actioned as a result of the Brigade’s decision upon review of the TUAV video 
imagery. For this block, an empirical table is used to make the selection. Each of the 
nodes is assigned a position in the empirical table and a percentage selection value. 
Once the final attribute is set, the item moves from the “JSTARS” block to 
the “JSTARS CGS” block (Fig. 15). 
 
2. JSTARS CGS 
At the CGS block, the item’s MTI Message size (MTI MSG) attribute is read. 
This is the size of the message passing from the JSTARS aircraft to the CGS. The 
message is then delayed by an amount equal to the message size divided by the 
bandwidth (in this case 10.1 Mbps, the data rate of the Common Data Link, or CDL). 
Once the delay is complete, the item passes to the “Brigade TOC – Out” block (Fig. 16). 
 
3. Brigade TOC – Out 
The CGS MSG attribute is read and a delay occurs equal to the message size 
divided by the bandwidth as the item arrives at the “TOC – Rec” node. In this case the 
message is passing over fast Ethernet, therefore the data rate is 100 Mb per second 
(Mbps). The item then passes  to the Brigade TOC-Send node. Here it experiences a 
delay of one to five minutes to account for the time it takes the Brigade to decide who 
will be tasked to further develop the MTI (TUAV or a ground reconnaissance element 
from within the Brigade) or what agency a request will go to for further development 


















































On exiting the TOC-Send block, the item’s TASKEE attribute value is set 
randomly through an empirical table. This attribute  determines which node receives the 
tasking/request to develop the MTI located by JSTARS. The possible values of this 
attribute are GCS (for TUAV tasking), GRD RECON (if being tasked to reconnaissance 
elements within the Brigade), AIR RECON (Air Force), and SAT RECON. Each of these 
table values has a percentage associated with it. 
Once the TASKEE value is set, the item moves through a FIFO (First In, First 
Out) Queue and is prepared to move to the selected node for further development. Before 
moving to the selected TASKEE node, an attribute is assigned to the item that marks the 
time that the TASKEE was assigned the mission. The item then passes on to an Extend 
Throw block, “TOC-Out”. This block reads the TASKEE attribute value and directs the 
item to the proper node (Fig. 17). If the receiving node is anything other than the GCS, 
the item exits the system. If the receiving node is the GCS node, the MTI item continues 
in the simulation and moves to the TUAV GCS for processing. 
 
4. TUAV GCS – Out 
Once into the “TUAV GCS - OUT” hierarchical block (Fig. 18), the item 
experiences a delay to account for the time either to prepare a fresh AV for the mission or 
to redirect an airborne AV with an immediate tasking. Once the delay is complete, the 
delay between mission assignment and the time the GCS was ready to begin the mission 





















































Figure 18. TUAV GCS-OUT Hierarchical Block 
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5. TUAV – Receive 
As the item passes to the “TUAV-RECEIVE” hierarchical block (Fig. 19), the 
current time is marked, in this case to note the time the command instructions for the new 
mission were transmitted by the GCS to the AV. The uplink delay between transmission 
of the command message and its receipt by the AV is captured as the item exits the 



















Figure 19. TUAV-RECEIVE Hierarchical Block 
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 6. TUAV – Mission 
 As the MTI item passes into the “TUAV-MISSON” hierarchical block, the time 
the AV initially begins traveling to the mission area is captured  (Fig. 20). The item 
moves into the “MISSION-EXECUTE” Activity Delay block where the delay from the 
TUAV receiving its command instructions to the TUAV arriving in the mission area is 


















Figure 20. TUAV-MISSION Hierarchical Block, Part I 
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 Once in a position to begin mission execution, i.e., the AV is close enough for the 
operator to make an identification, the simulation compares the slant range of the MTI to 
the AV’s threshold survivable stand off range (Fig. 21). If the target is outside of this 
range, the MTI proceeds to transmit imagery to the “TUAV GCS-IN” block. If the slant 
range is within the survivable stand off range, the AV is potentially “shot down” (based 
off of empirical table inputs). If not downed, the time that the AV was ready to begin 























7. TUAV GCS – In 
As the imagery flows along the TCDL to the GCS, it is delayed by the MPEG-2 
video size divided by the bandwidth (10.1 Mbps) at the GCS-REC Activity Delay block 
(Fig. 22). This is the downlink delay measuring the time between the beginning of 
imagery transmission to receipt at the GCS. As the item exits the GCS-REC block, the 
downlink delay is measured. The item then proceeds to a FIFO queue and is ready to 



















Figure 22. TUAV  GCS-IN Hierarchical Block 
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 8. BDE TOC – In 
At the “BDE TOC – IN” hierarchical block (Fig. 23) there is a delay of one to 
five minutes to account for the Brigade decision time – is the target friendly, enemy, or a 
neutral (the CID) and what COA does the decision-maker take.  
A key point  – neither the TUAV system, nor any UAV system, can 
autonomously determine a combat identification. The identification process will always 
involve a “man in the loop”. Whether the identification is made, and if so whether or not 



















Figure 23. BDE TOC – IN Hierarchical Block 
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 Once the Brigade decides on a COA, the item proceeds in the simulation and the 
attribute relating to the COA is read. The item then exits the BDE block and enters a 
Throw block (Fig. 24), where the item will be directed to one of four potential action 
nodes: alert (do not engage, item is friendly or neutral); engage with indirect fires; 
engage with direct fires; other (e.g., continue to observe for later decision). The item then 
exits the simulation. As the item exits, a plotter captures the total number of missions 
executed off of TUAV imagery, along with total missions assigned to the TUAV system 



















Figure 24. Brigade Action Decision Options 
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 C. MODEL CONFIGURATION 
 
 Following are the initial settings for the Extend modeling blocks. System 
parameters that will not change throughout the testing are labeled “fixed” and their 
values will not be discussed when adjustments are made to the model. 
 
1.  “JSTARS” Generator Block 
MTI generation follows an exponential distribution with mean interarrival times 
of 15 minutes. This means that one MTI item is sent from the JSTARS to the JSTARS 
CGS every 15 minutes of the simulation. 
 
2. “MTI Message” Input Random Number Variable Block 
A real, uniform distribution is used for this variable. The minimum is 0.5 MB, the 
maximum 10 MB (fixed). 
 
3. “CGS Message” Input Random Number Block 
A real, uniform distribution. Values from 0.02 MB to 0.5 MB (fixed). 
 
4. “GCS Out” Input Random Number Block 
A real, uniform distribution between 0.002 MB (2 kb) and 1 MB (fixed). 
 
5. “Video Size” Input Random Number Block 
MPEG-2 video of 30 to 900 Mb (based on 15 Mb per minute of video and 
mission durations of two minutes to one hour)(fixed). 
 
6. “Action” Input Random Number Block 
An empirical table is used to select one of four possible values: Value 1 (Alert) 30 
percent chance of being selected, Value 2 (Indirect Fire) 35 percent, Value 3 (Direct Fire) 
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25 percent, and Value 4 (Other) 10 percent. The COA is for demonstrative purposes only 
as the action takes place after the CID decision is made. 
 
7. “CDL” Constant Blocks 
10.1 Mbps constant CDL downlink data rate (fixed) and a constant of 60 to 
convert seconds to minutes. 
 
 8. “TACLAN” Constant Block 
100 Mbps Tactical LAN data rate (fixed) constant, again with a constant of 60 to 
convert seconds to minutes. 
 
9. “Decision Time” Input Random Number Block 
A real, uniform distribution. Minimum of one minute, maximum of five minutes 
(fixed). This delay simulates the amount of time it takes the Brigade to decide how they 
want to develop the MTI item…TUAV, ground reconnaissance, aircraft, or satellite. 
 
10. “Taskee” Input Random Number Block 
An empirical table used. Four possible values: Value 1 (TUAV tasking) 50 
percent, Value 2 (Ground Recon tasking) 20 percent, Value 3 (Air Recon request) 25 
percent, and Value 4 (Satellite Imagery request) five percent. 
 
11. “TUAV Prep” Input Random Number Block 
A real, uniform distribution. For the initial simulation, the AV being used is on 
the ground and will take 15 to 30 minutes to prep, take off, and move towards the mission 
area. 
 
 12. “TCDL Uplink” Constant Blocks 
 The TCDL uplink rate is 200 Kbps, therefore constant of 0.2 Mbps (fixed), 
divided by a constant of 60 for second-to-minute conversion. 
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  13. “Travel Time” Input Random Number Block 
 A real, uniform distribution. Minimum of five minutes and maximum of 30 
minutes (fixed). 
 
 14. Slant Range Input Random Variable Block 
 Empirical table input into a Select DE block that simulates the AV being inside or 
outside the survivable stand off range when it acquires the target (i.e., the operator is able 
to detect the target). The MTI item will continue through the simulation and the AV will 
begin transmitting imagery to the GCS 92.5 percent of the time (fixed). This is based off 
of testing that indicates 92.5 percent detection success of the AV’s Forward Looking 
Infrared (FLIR) pod outside of the 3 km threshold survivable stand off range. The 
remainder of the items (7.5 percent) (fixed) will continue to another DE Select Block 
(“Shoot Down?”). 
 
 15. “Shoot Down” Input Random Variable Block 
 Input from empirical table. Fifty percent of AVs flying inside of the threshold 
survivable stand off range will be “shot down” and exit the simulation (fixed). 
 
 16. “TCDL Downlink” Constant Blocks 
 The TCDL downlink rate for transmission of MPEG-2 video to GCS is 10.1 
Mbps. A constant of 60 is again used for seconds-to-minutes conversion. 
 
 17. “Action Decision” Input Random Number Block 
 A real, uniform distribution of one to five minutes for the Brigade to decide on a 





 18. Simulation Time 
 The initial simulation time is 240 minutes to replicate the maximum four hour 
duration of the Shadow 200 TUAV and assumes (for initial set up) that the AV is on the 
ground and fully fueled prior to mission start. 
 
 19. Discrete Event (DE) Plotters 
 Plotters are used to display the results of simulation runs. For the four “delay” 
plotters – prep, uplink, travel, and delay - the vertical axis portrays the applicable delay 
in minutes and the horizontal axis marks the simulation time (in minutes). For the 
“totals” plotter, the horizontal axis continues to mark simulation time and the vertical 
axis measures the three applicable totals – total missions assigned to the TUAV system, 
total TUAV missions accomplished, and total number of AVs shot down. 
 
D. SCENARIOS MODELED 
 
Three scenarios were developed and modeled for simulation. Each was run for ten 
iterations and the results captured and analyzed. 
 
1. Scenario 1 – Ground Alert Tasking 
In this scenario, the AV is still on the ground at the Launch and Recovery site. No 
preplanning has occurred for the tasking from Brigade. Variables are set per paragraph C 
above. 
 
2. Scenario 2 – Immediate Tasking 
The AV is already airborne and receives a change of mission based off of a 
Brigade tasking.  The AV prep time variable (previously set to range between 15 and 30 
minutes) is lowered to range from one to five minutes. Using an immediate tasking also 
means the AV has potentially been airborne for an extended period of time. The 
simulation run time was cut from four hours to three hours to account for this. 
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 3. Scenario 3 – Immediate Tasking with Improved Downlink 
No changes from Scenario 2 other than the future planned TCDL downlink rate of 
45 Mbps is used in lieu of the current 10.1 Mbps rate. 
 
E. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
Four system delay plots were drawn for each iteration:  
 
• AV preparation time delay (Prep Delay) 
• Uplink delay 
• AV travel time delay (Travel Delay) 
• Downlink delay 
 
A final plotter measured three items:  
 
• Total number of missions assigned to the TUAV system  
• Total number of successfully completed TUAV missions 
• Total number of TUAVs shot down 
 
Figure 25 illustrates how an Extend plotter displays data within the simulation. 
By copying the data at the bottom of the display and pasting it into a spreadsheet 
program, the data can be manipulated and useful information extracted. 
 
1. Scenario 1 (Iterations 1.1 – 1.10) 


















Figure 25. Extend Discrete Event Plotter 
 
TUAV system by the TOC during the four-hour mission windows and 5.6 of these 
assignments resulted in an AV beaming back imagery resulting in successful CID and an 
action decision (Fig. 26). In just under seven percent of the iterations, an AV was downed 
after flying inside survivable stand off range.  
The percentage of missions completed ranged from a low of 50 percent to a high 
of 90 percent, averaging 75.7 percent over the course of the ten iterations.  As shown in 
Figure 27, two types of delays were by far the most significant in Scenario 1 – prep 
delays (accounting for 58.7 percent) and travel delays (39.4 percent). Delays caused by 
the uplink and downlink proved insignificant throughout the scenario, averaging 2.4 and 
48 seconds, respectively. Combined, the link delays were less than two percent of the 
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Overview of Scenario 1 Results 
 
MISSION OVERVIEW 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 TOTAL AVG
Assigned 11 4 9 7 5 5 10 6 9 8 74 7.4
Successful
     Total 7 2 8 6 4 4 8 5 7 5 56 5.6
     % 0.636 0.500 0.889 0.857 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.833 0.778 0.625 0.757
AVs Shot Down
     Total 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 0.5
     % 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.100 0.000 0.111 0.125 0.068
Incomplete
     Total 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 13 1.3
     % 0.273 0.500 0.111 0.143 0.200 0.000 0.100 0.167 0.111 0.250 0.176
DELAYS OVERVIEW 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10
Total Time of Delays 385.68 123.09 347.62 278.16 154.17 140.40 375.15 245.88 347.02 267.28
Prep
     Total 214.85 74.48 225.72 179.14 88.31 87.97 203.45 132.67 187.53 159.55
     Avg 21.49 24.83 25.08 25.59 22.08 17.59 22.61 22.11 23.44 22.79
     % of Total Delays 0.557 0.605 0.649 0.644 0.573 0.627 0.542 0.540 0.540 0.597
Uplink
     Total 0.53 0.07 0.31 0.31 0.18 0.25 0.39 0.26 0.35 0.22
     Avg. 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
     % of Total Delays 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Travel
     Total 164.28 46.96 114.51 93.63 61.01 50.01 166.38 108.80 153.30 103.81
     Avg. 18.25 23.48 14.31 15.61 15.25 10.00 18.49 21.76 19.16 17.30
     % of Total Delays 0.426 0.381 0.329 0.337 0.396 0.356 0.444 0.442 0.442 0.388
Downlink
     Total 6.03 1.59 7.08 5.08 4.67 2.16 4.93 4.14 5.84 3.71
     Avg. 0.75 0.79 0.89 0.85 1.17 0.54 0.62 0.83 0.83 0.74






* All delays measured in minutes 
 


























































2. Scenario 2 (Iterations 2.1 – 2.10) 
Over the course of ten iterations, an average of 4.8 missions were assigned to the 
TUAV system by the TOC and 4.1 of these assignments resulted in an AV beaming back 
imagery resulting in successful CID and an action decision (Fig. 28).  There was little 
change in the shootdown rate from Scenario 1 – again just under seven percent of the 
AVs were shot down after flying inside survivable stand off range. 
 
 
Overview of Scenario 2 Results 
MISSION OVERVIEW 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 TOTAL AVG
Assigned 6 5 5 7 5 4 3 3 6 4 48 4.8
Successful
     Total 6 5 5 7 3 3 2 2 5 3 41 4.1
     % 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.600 0.750 0.667 0.667 0.833 0.750 0.854
AVs Shot Down
     Total 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 0.3
     % 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.063
Incomplete
     Total 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 0.4
     % 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.333 0.000 0.167 0.250 0.083
DELAYS OVERVIEW 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10
Total Time of Delays 118.63 125.15 76.67 136.16 118.32 129.78 52.45 54.74 103.14 58.26
Prep
     Total 18.30 15.10 10.43 20.39 15.17 12.18 6.98 9.70 19.19 11.25
     Avg 3.05 3.02 2.09 2.91 3.03 3.04 3.49 3.23 3.20 2.81
     % of Total Delays 0.154 0.121 0.136 0.150 0.128 0.094 0.133 0.177 0.186 0.193
Uplink
     Total 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.35 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.28 0.12
     Avg. 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03
     % of Total Delays 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.223 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
Travel
     Total 95.16 104.77 62.28 108.70 100.30 113.28 44.34 43.58 78.35 43.98
     Avg. 15.86 20.95 12.46 15.53 20.06 28.32 22.17 14.53 15.67 14.66
     % of Total Delays 0.802 0.837 0.812 0.798 0.848 0.873 0.845 0.796 0.760 0.755
Downlink
     Total 4.91 5.05 3.76 6.72 2.62 4.09 1.01 1.34 5.31 2.91
     Avg. 0.82 1.01 0.75 0.96 0.87 1.02 0.50 0.67 1.06 0.97




* All delays measured in minutes 
 
Figure 28. Overview of Scenario 2 Results 
 
The percentage of successful missions increased substantially from Scenario 1, 
ranging between 60 and 100 percent, with an average completion rate of 85 percent. With 
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this scenario’s change, lowering the prep time from 15-30 minutes to one-five minutes, 
the prep time delay lowered markedly, from almost 60 percent of the delays in Scenario 1 
to 14.7 percent of the delays in Scenario 2. Travel time accounted for most of the delays 
(Fig. 29), averaging 81.3 percent of total delays over the ten iterations of Scenario 2. 
Again, uplink and downlink delays were very small in the overall scheme.  While their 
percentages as part of the overall delays increased slightly, the average time per link 
delay increased by less than three seconds. The results for the ten Scenario 2 iterations 


















































Figure 29. Scenario 2 Average Delays 
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 3. Scenario 3 (Iterations 3.1 – 3.10) 
Increasing the downlink data rate in Scenario 3 (from 10.1 Mbps to 45 Mbps) 
lowered the average downlink delay from 51.6 seconds to 10.2 seconds. The only other 
significant change was a 50 percent reduction in the shootdown rate, from just over six 
percent to just over three percent (Fig. 30). The Scenario 3 individual results can be 
viewed in Appendix C. 
 
 
Overview of Scenario 3 Results 
MISSION OVERVIEW 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 TOTAL AVG
Assigned 6 9 5 3 7 10 7 5 5 5 62 6.2
Successful
     Total 5 8 5 3 6 8 6 5 4 5 55 5.5
     % 0.833 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.857 0.800 0.857 1.000 0.800 1.000 0.887
AVs Shot Down
     Total 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.2
     % 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032
Incomplete
     Total 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 5 0.5
     % 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.143 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.081
DELAYS OVERVIEW 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10
Total Time of Delays 79.89 148.56 101.70 45.87 127.20 172.76 104.27 120.65 79.81 61.91
Prep
     Total 17.34 22.85 13.84 6.78 24.62 29.17 21.87 13.23 13.56 8.19
     Avg 2.89 2.54 2.77 2.26 3.52 2.92 3.12 2.65 2.71 1.64
     % of Total Delays 0.217 0.154 0.136 0.148 0.194 0.169 0.210 0.110 0.170 0.132
Uplink
     Total 0.23 0.30 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.37 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.13
     Avg. 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03
     % of Total Delays 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Travel
     Total 61.77 123.70 86.65 38.63 101.51 141.63 81.25 106.41 65.09 52.55
     Avg. 12.35 13.74 17.33 12.88 14.50 17.70 13.54 21.28 16.27 10.51
     % of Total Delays 0.773 0.833 0.852 0.842 0.798 0.820 0.779 0.882 0.816 0.849
Downlink
     Total 0.55 1.72 1.02 0.39 0.85 1.59 0.88 0.69 0.97 1.04
     Avg. 0.11 0.22 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.24 0.21




* All delays measured in minutes 
 
Figure 30. Overview of Scenario 3 Results 
 50
  Prep and uplink delays remained relatively constant, averaging 3.0 minutes and 
2.7 minutes, respectively. The average travel delay, the longest type of delay in Scenario 
3 (Fig. 31), increased approximately one minute. Downlink delays, which in Scenario 2 
averaged .86 minutes (50 seconds) each, were down to .17 minutes (10.2 seconds) each, a 















































Figure 31. Scenario 3 Average Delays 
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 F. SIMULATION CONCLUSIONS 
 
This simulation was used as a process model to determine possible improvements 
that could be made in the TUAV system if it is to be used as a CID tool. From a 
technological standpoint, can the system aid ground forces in determining whether or not 
to pull a trigger? The bottomline answer is yes, the simulation showed that a single 
TUAV system can aid in multiple CID decisions during a single mission. The primary 
factors in the TUAV's timeliness as a CID tool were the amount of time to prep the AV 
for the mission and the travel time for the AV to reach the target area (Fig. 32). By 
decreasing the length of these delays, the system’s ability to function as a useful CID tool 



























Figure 32. Overall Simulation Average Delays Per Mission
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 1. Taskees 
It is obvious that a given TUAV system can handle only so many tasking 
(whether CID taskings or some other type of reconnaissance mission) during its mission 
window.  For the simulation the system received 50 percent of the MTI items that needed 
further reconnaissance.  Another option is to task a greater percentage of MTI follow-ups 
to ground reconnaissance elements – whether they be from the Brigade’s Reconnaissance 
Troop, Battalion Scout Platoons, or mechanized units subordinate to the Brigade – or 
requesting aerial reconnaissance or satellite imagery from outside agencies not 
subordinate to the Brigade ( and thus not as responsive). Tasking the ground elements for 
a large number of reconnaissance tasks above and beyond their currently assigned 
missions is generally not a good idea. In particular the Reconnaissance Troop and the 
Scouts are inherently overtasked to begin with. Possible solutions will be addressed in 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. AV Prep Time 
AVs on the ground prior to mission tasking took an average of 20 minutes longer 
to prepare for the mission than those receiving an immediate tasking while airborne.  On 
top of the quicker response time, using a “hot” AV has the additional benefit of putting 
the AV closer to the mission area when it receives the tasking (as the L/R Site is located 
five to ten kilometers behind the TOC area in most tactical situations). On the downside, 
an immediate tasking to the AV may take it away from a critical mission that the 
commander wants accomplished. The bottomline - before retasking an AV, the criticality 
of saving a few minutes in getting the new target’s imagery to the TOC must be weighed 
against potential impacts to the current mission plan. 
 
3. Uplink Delays 
The 200 Kbps uplink rate proved satisfactory throughout the simulation.  
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4. Travel Delays 
Travel delays averaged between 15 and 20 minutes per assigned mission. This 
was the largest type of delay experienced in the simulation during the “immediate 
tasking” types of missions where the AV was already airborne. It is clear that the number 
of CID missions the Brigade can accomplish with a given AV during its mission window 
is very dependent on how wisely the Brigade decision makers manage their assets. An 
example of good asset management would be to task a mechanized company in the 
vicinity of a questionable MTI to investigate the unknown target rather than tasking an 
AV that is ten kilometers away and in the process of carrying out a planned 
reconnaissance and security (R&S) mission. 
 
5. Shoot Downs 
In Scenarios 1 and 2, the shoot down rate of AVs ranged between six and seven 
percent. In these shoot downs, the AVs had to get too close to the target in order for an 
operator to make a CID decision. This rate of loss may sound high, but keep in mind that 
seven Army Hunter UAVs, almost half of the Hunters in the theater, were shot down by 
the Yugoslavians or crashed during NATO’s Operation Allied Force 78-day air war in 
1999 [Ref. 13].  
In Scenario 3, when the downlink rate was changed from the current 10.1 Mbps to 
the planned 45 Mbps, the shoot down rate dropped to just over three percent. It appears 
that AV survivability is enhanced by the quicker imagery download rate – less loiter time 
equals less shoot downs. 
Another observation in this area deals with CID training. The AVs resolution is 
sufficient that it should not need to get within threshold survivable stand off in order for 
an identification to be made. The primary remedy for this is operator CID training, which 
will be discussed in conclusions and recommendations. 
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6. Downlink Delays 
While the downlink delays throughout the simulation were not significant as a 
whole, it was clear that once the rate is increased from the current 10.1 Mbps to the 
planned 45 Mbps, a significant cut will be made in these types of delays. On average, the 
delays decreased by almost 40 seconds per assigned mission. Not only can this make a 
difference in the AVs survivability, but also it increases the number of missions that the 
AV can perform during its mission window.  
A way to reduce this delay even further, regardless of which downlink rate is 
used, is through operator CID training. The faster an imagery analyst makes an 
identification, the less time before the GCS AV operator can move the AV from the 
target area. The amount of time saved is dependent on where the imagery analyst making 
the CID is located. If he is at the Brigade TOC and the TOC is collocated with the GCS, 
the amount of loiter time cut will be greater than if the CID is made by someone at an 
RVT who has to send the ID over a radio. 
Finally, we should not neglect the fact that other systems will likely be tied into 
the Tactical Common Data Link used by the TUAV. Keeping the amount of imagery 
down and increasing the link’s data rate will help the TCDL from being over-saturated 
with electronic traffic.  
 
7. Action Decision Delays 
These delays were not measured in the simulation because they were so small – 
set for a one to five minute delay. One to five minutes is an adequate amount of time for 
trained personnel to make a COA decision given the proper target resolution. If a unit 
places inexperienced people in the position to make these calls, one or more things will 
happen – the time needed for identification will increase, the possibility of making the 
wrong CID call escalates, and/or an AV will be shot down as operators have to bring the 
Shadows too close to an unfriendly target for a better look. 
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IV.  ASCIET 2000 EVALUATION OBSERVATIONS 
 
This chapter describes UAV-specific observations made during the All Service 
Combat Identification Team (ASCIET) evaluation conducted 28 February through 10 
March 2000 at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Renamed in late 2000 as the Joint Combat 
Identification Team (JCIET), JCIET is based at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida and is part 
of Joint Forces Command. JCIET is responsible for testing the equipment, methods, and 
engagement tactics of the four branches of the U.S. armed forces to learn how well they 
avoid the problem of mistaking friendly forces for the enemy. It addresses the high level 
fratricide concerns brought about by the increased emphasis on joint warfare operations 
and the fielding of weapons and sensor systems operating beyond visual range, at night, 
and in adverse weather conditions.  
JCIET accomplishes their mission through the conduct of annual evaluations that 
bring together representative units and equipment from each of the services’ ground, 
missile, and aviation communities for a two week joint tactical scenario involving the 
Ground to Ground, Ground to Air, Air to Ground, and Air to Air mission areas. All 
mission area players are heavily instrumented. At the conclusion of the evaluation, JCIET 
examines the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by the units, along with the 
data JCIET analysts extrapolate through the instrumentation, and makes 
recommendations on possible ways of improving CID in the joint arena. 
The UAV system utilized during ASCIET 2000 was the Hunter UAV. While this 
is a different system than the Shadow 200 used as the Brigade’s TUAV, the observations 
that follow are not system-specific, but are observations on the Army and Marine units’ 





Steve Mecham of SAIC, JCIET's lead UAV analyst, noted that the most eye–
opening observations on UAV use in ASCIET 2000 lay in integration [Ref. 14]. While 
both the Army and Marines present at the evaluation were sold on the UAVs use in 
support of the tactical commander, neither force was able to fully integrate the UAV into 
the current operation. TTPs for the UAVs use as both a surveillance and fire support tool 





The JCIET Staff noted duplicate or contradictory report generation on several 
occasions during ASCIET 2000. The primary reason for this erroneous reporting was 
multiple people looking at the same imagery feed from different locations - from ground 
control stations as wells as at remote video terminals passed down to the battalion 
headquarters. Different “analysts” at different imagery reception nodes would report on 
the same target (resulting in multiple reports) or send differing information about the 
same target regarding direction of movement, type, etc., resulting in contradictory 
reports. This was primarily a breakdown in reporting procedures, a topic that will be dealt 
with in the conclusions and recommendations section. 
 
C. REMOTE VIDEO TERMINAL (RVT) USE AT SUB-UNIT LEVEL 
 
Both the Marine and Army higher headquarters sent RVTs to subordinate 
battalions for their use during ASCIET 2000. The comments from the sub-units’ 
Battalion Intelligence Officers (S2s) were similar. Both noted that information derived 
from UAV reports received from their higher headquarters was often more useful than 
the imagery they were receiving near real time on the supplied RVTs. Both units also 
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stated that they lacked the manpower and the expertise to properly man the RVTs. As 
noted earlier, the battalions also had reports of movement duplicated at the Battalion, 
Brigade, and Joint Task Force levels. 
Dr. Scott Ritchey noted that during the first week of the evaluation, no one in the 
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence tent looked at the UAV display 
[Ref. 15]. Personnel were functioning as they were trained, and their training did not 
include stewardship of the UAV display. After the first week, a Marine NCO rearranged 
the floor plan, grouping the Generic Area Limitation Environment (GALE-LITE), UAV 
display, and JSTARS Remote Workstation (RWS) display together in a corner. Both the 
GALE-LITE and RWS had dedicated, assigned, trained operators. As there was not a 
great deal of SIGINT activity, the GALE operator began looking at the UAV display out 
of boredom, becoming the de facto imagery analyst and made good use of the UAV after 
a freeze-picture capability was added [Ref. 16]. 
 
D. INABILITY TO MAKE COMBAT IDENTIFICATION 
 
 Mecham noted that only about 35 percent of UAV detections (by personnel 
viewing the video in multiple nodes) were actually identified. Dr. Ritchey made a similar 
observation in the MAGTF COC. Less than ten percent of the detections resulted in the 
generation of a fire mission or support to a Close Air Support (CAS) mission.  Why the 
difficulty in identifying a detected target? It was not an imagery resolution issue, but 
rather an inability on the part of analysts to tell one type of vehicle from another. This is 
a training shortfall and is further addressed in the following section. Possible solutions 
will be discussed in conclusions and recommendations. 
 
E. OPERATOR VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION TRAINING 
 
Most of the Intel analysts are not trained to exploit thermal imagery. The best 
thermal imagery analysts were the personnel who used it everyday – the tank and fighting 
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vehicle crewmen. Unfortunately, putting these personnel in front of a TUAV imagery 
display means they are not carrying out the jobs they are trained to do – closing with and 
destroying the enemy. 
 
F. INITIAL AVERSION TO INFRARED (IR) MODE 
 
Players did not use the thermal channel until the first night mission (occurring in 
Week 2 of the evaluation). It was obvious that the personnel acting as imagery analysts 
felt much more comfortable viewing the EO imagery, a pure daylight view. Because they 
had preconceived ideas that “thermal is hard”, they felt that the UAV would not be useful 
at night. They later admitted they were very wrong on that score. The analysts were so 
impressed by the thermal imagery once they began using it during the second week that 
IR became their primary mode of operation for both day and night operations. 
The imagery analysts, most of them trained SIGINT analysts temporarily assigned 
to man the UAV stations, quickly learned thermal identification features. They found that 
IR was excellent for cueing,  and they were able to select potential targets (hot spots) 
much quicker than they had been able to in EO mode. The thermal mode also enabled 
analysts to detect and identify targets under thin tree cover. This would have been 
impossible in EO mode. During some follow-on daylight missions, analysts began 
switching between EO and IR modes, using IR the majority of the time, but occasionally 
switching to the EO channel to capitalize on its superior resolution to identify target 
details for those vehicles operating in the open. 
 
G. AIR-TO-SURFACE COMBAT I.D. PANEL (CIP) 
 
 Dr. Ritchey made an interesting observation while analyzing UAV imagery after 
one mission – a distinctive thermal signature on a vehicle [Ref. 16]. It was a high-
contrast, rectangular cold spot (therefore white) on the back deck of a vehicle. Figure 33 
is a photo of the vehicle (second in column). Subsequent investigation found this vehicle 
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to be a Russian BMP Infantry Fighting Vehicle and that the cold spot was a drip pan 







Figure 33. Hunter UAV IR Shot of Drip Pan on Rear Deck of BMP [From: Ref. 16] 
 
 Figures 34 and 35 are close-ups of the drip pan. It was purchased at a NAPA auto 
parts store (Part number BK 811-4000) and appears to be zinc electro-plate with a thin 
film of dirt. The conclusion was that the drip pan acted as an upward-facing CIP, 





Figure 34. Top View of Drip Pan [From: Ref. 16] 
 
 
Figure 35. Rear View of Drip Pan [From: Ref. 16] 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the Extend simulation, the Shadow 200 tests conducted to date by 
the Army, and the observations made by JCIET during its evaluations support that the 
Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system can aid the tactical commander as a CID tool. 
While the simulation results support the TUAVs ability to aid in CID, there are 
still areas where improvement can be made if the system is to live up to its full potential. 
The following issues should be addressed not only to aid units’ CID efforts, but also if 
the TUAV is to in fact become the ground maneuver commander’s primary day/night 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) system. Additionally, 
many of these conclusions, as well as the recommendations that follow, are applicable to 
Marine Corps UAV usage at the tactical level, regardless of which system they field. 
 
1. Vehicle Identification Training 
The amount and level of vehicle identification training (particularly thermal 
identification training) needs to be increased for all imagery analysts. 
 
2. Integration 
The TUAV system should be integrated with other currently available CID 
equipment. 
 
3. Surface-to-Air CID Panel 
The Army and Marine Corps ground forces need a Surface-to Air combat 
identification panel to serve as a thermal ID recognition feature to AV imagery analysts, 
as well as to helicopter and close air support crews. 
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4. TUAV Planning and Mission Execution 
Brigade staffs must ensure the TUAV’s use as a CID tool is planned in 
conjunction with the commander’s reconnaissance and surveillance plan for proper 
mission integration, as well as ensure that the TUAV’s use during mission execution falls 
within the Commander’s Intent. 
 
5. Automation in the CID Process 
DoD should increase research that will reduce or remove the “man in the loop” in 
the imagery analyses process. The most likely method of accomplishing this is through 
the use of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and Automatic Target Recognition (ATR).  
SAR sensors can image ground targets at extremely high resolutions and long 
ranges, through clouds and in darkness. The SAR takes a series of low-resolution images 
in sequence. These images are then synthetically combined to give a high-resolution 
product. We see that each object has a unique “signature”. ATR is the process of using a 
computer to assist in identifying which features in a scene indicate a target’s presence.  
When combined, these technologies would be able to cue analysts to areas of interest, 
reducing the time required for them to review each image. A very robust ATR system 
that includes an identification algorithm could identify and locate targets without 
operator intervention and with low false alarm rates.  
The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) is currently working 
a project called Moving and Stationary Target Acquisition and Recognition (MSTAR) 
[Ref. 17]. MSTAR will identify tactical and strategic targets in SAR imagery. While 
DARPA, as well as other agencies, institutions, and corporations, have made major 
strides in ATR and its application in the visible domain, millimeter wave (MMW) radar, 
laser radar, SAR, and other sensors, the technology is not yet present to even semi-
automate the CID process. Despite the tremendous increase in computing power in recent 
years, the major technical challenge remains – the development of robust algorithms 
(single and multi-sensor) to deal with variations in target signatures (e.g., stores, 
articulation, manufacturing, system wear and tear), target acquisition parameters (e.g., 
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aspect, depression, squint angles), target phenomenology (e.g., cavity responses, glints, 
IR thermal behavior), and target/clutter interaction (e.g., foliage masking, camouflage). 
An additional challenge is to develop the algorithms such that they maintain low false 
alarm rates and operate in real time. One of the more promising SAR/ATR systems will 
be examined further in the recommendations section. 
But another question must be answered as well in regard to ATR – assuming we 
develop a dependable, low false alarm rate ATR system that can operate in real time/near 
real time, to what extent should the CID process be automated? This issue will be 
discussed in the recommendations section as well. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are tied to the conclusion in paragraph A above. 
 
1. Use of ROC-V Software for Thermal Vehicle Recognition Training 
Recognition of Combat Vehicles (ROC-V), sponsored by the Army’s Product 
Manager Forward Looking Infrared Radar (PM FLIR) and developed by the Night Vision 
and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, is a multimedia-
based software package contained on a single CD ROM that teaches users thermal 
vehicle recognition. The system requirements of a 133 Mhz Pentium PC/laptop with 
Windows 95 and a CD ROM are basic enough that training can be conducted anywhere 
from the unit training room to field or float locations. ROC-V version 7.0 is compatible 
with Windows 95, 98, NT, ME, and 2000 and includes two CDs – one for training units 
equipped with the older thermal imaging systems and one for training units equipped 
with the new Second Generation FLIR. 
ROC-V utilizes an extensive database of real thermal images to teach and test the 
signatures 47 U.S. and non-U.S. vehicles (Figs. 36 through 38). Training includes 
teaching the user unique hot spot shapes and locations of engines and exhausts as well as 
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the geometric vehicle cues. This software is a vast improvement over using flash cards, 
etc., as training aids - particularly where thermal ID training is involved. 
 A shortfall in using  ROC-V to train UAV operators on vehicle ID is a lack of 
“top down” imagery as would be seen from an AV.  Because the distinctive thermal 
signatures of different vehicle types do not change regardless of the operator’s view, 
training imagery analysts with the current version of ROC-V would still have some 
usefulness. With that said, however, I would recommend incorporation of top-down 
imagery for the vehicles in the current ROC-V database. This would not only aid in the 
training of UAV operators and analysts, but also has potential training value for 
helicopter crewmen. 
 
2. Integration of Combat Identification Systems 
 Dr. Stephen Wiener of The MITRE Corporation suggests that if we are looking at 
two technologies to fill the CID role, perhaps neither can do the job satisfactorily by itself 
[Ref. 18].  By combining two CID technologies, a synergistic affect may be attained. 
A concept being examined by PM CI is to equip UAVs with an MTI radar and a 
Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) – this could be one of the modular 
payloads for a TUAV system. The AV relays to the TUAV GCS the coordinates of 
moving vehicles on the battlefield and which of those vehicles have responded to the 
BCIS query. Looking at his display at the GCS, the AV operator can see the coordinates 
of confirmed friendly vehicles and the coordinates of any “unidentified vehicles” in the 
vicinity. 
A possible improvement on this idea would be to continue using a wide area 
sensor such as JSTARS for cueing and for the AV to have a combination of EO/IR and 
BCIS capabilities. This could present a problem with the current TUAV system due to 
payload weight restrictions, but could likely be planned for future systems, particularly 
the more robust Division and Corps TUAV systems that are the next step in developing 





















Figure 38. Shot of ROC-V Testing Screen [From: Ref. 19] 
  
 3. Incorporate the TUAV Plan Into Current Operations 
 The TUAV is useful to the Brigade Commander’s reconnaissance, surveillance, 
identification, and targeting efforts – but it must be properly employed. If not 
synchronized with the Commander’s overall plan, focus will be lost as the AV is 
dynamically retasked around the battlefield [Ref. 20]. The TUAV system’s integration 
into the overall tactical plan must correlate with the Commander’s Intent and TOC 
personnel must ensure that in the absence of the Commander, they know and adhere to 
his guidance regarding the TUAVs employment. Retasking an AV currently monitoring 
what has been identified as a critical Named Area of Interest (NAI) or High Value Target 
(HVT) to investigate an unknown MTI may be counterproductive to the overall mission. 
If the MTI is deep, the AV can be tasked later (while the wide area sensor continues to 
track it) or a new AV launched to investigate. Of course, the MTI may be along a route 
the Commander or S2 considers a likely enemy main avenue of approach and retasking 
the AV makes sense within the current plan. Bottomline, someone at the TOC has to be 
 68
intimately familiar with the overall plan and make the call on where to prioritize the 
TUAV assets at any given moment. 
 
 4. Reduce the Role of “The Man in the Loop” Through SAR/ATR 
 One thing should be clear by this point – it does not matter how good the 
resolution is on a UAV, a “man in the loop” has to look at the imagery, analyze it, and 
make a decision on what type of vehicle it is that he is seeing. If we can reduce/remove 
the role of the man in the loop in the CID process, it will both decrease decision time and 
increase likelihood of making the correct CID call. A TUAV payload that incorporates a 
SAR, which is one of the future payloads being designed for the TUAV, combined with 
an ATR system at the GCS, could provide this solution in the near future.  
 Sandia National Laboratories, a national multiprogram lab working primarily in 
national defense research and development, advertises that their SAR Automatic 
Recognition Systems can “rapidly and reliably identify time critical military targets in 
SAR imagery” [Ref. 21].  In Sandia’s algorithm development phase, the expected 
appearance of target vehicles in SAR imagery are modeled from available data. The 
degree of variation expected in the different types of targets is also quantified.  Match 
metrics gauge the level of agreement between target models and unknown objects in new 
SAR imagery. The metrics, derived from mathematical principles, are designed to 
perform well in the presence of target signature variabilities arising from diverse sources 
such as rotating target parts, changing background surfaces and vegetation, partial target 
obscuration, and attempts at camouflage, concealment, and deception. 
 An independent evaluation of Sandia’s ATR system’s effectiveness was made 
during the Air Force’s Expeditionary Force Experiment ’98 (EFX ’98), an exercise 
designed to test current, developing, and emerging technologies, and explore new 
operational concepts. The Joint Test Force report stated the following:  
This test proved the feasibility of real-time ATR on Joint STARS…in the 
JTF's opinion, the ID accuracy and false alarm rate are extremely 
encouraging.… 
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 Figures 39 and 40 display ATR results as seen on a workstation using VITec 
ELT. Objects were detected using SAR, compared with signatures in the database (and 
signature variability accounted for), and identification of the vehicle types annotated on 
the workstation. 
 As discussed in the conclusions section, a question still remains regarding the 
degree of automation an ATR system should be allowed. Should we allow a proven ATR 
system of the future to autonomously decide whether a target is friendly or foe? 
Assuming we do, should we allow the ATR system to send firing instructions to weapons 
systems tied into it, such as AFATDS, if the ATR system identifies a target as a 
“hostile”?  
My answer to this question is no. While allowing the system this degree of 
decision-making power would undoubtedly reduce target engagement times, especially in 
the case of critically close targets with short-duration engagement windows, the fact 
remains that one digital snag could mean a lot of dead soldiers on the battlefield. 
 Instead of allowing the ATR system total autonomy, use ATR to cue analysts and 
decision-makers to those targets on a cluttered battlefield that are most likely enemy. In 
effect the ATR system would be an “aided” target recognition system, rather than an 
automatic target recognition system, allowing enemy systems to be identified quicker and 
going further, to prioritize those that are the biggest threat to the Brigade’s assets so that 
these priority targets can be engaged first. In this way, rather than passing responsibility 
for our soldiers lives to a system, we can use ATR to accomplish two tasks. First, aid the 
TUAV “man in the loop” by providing him with an automated CID tool to supplement 
his own knowledge base. Second, Brigade’s can make quicker decisions on time critical 


























5.  Standardize Imagery Reporting Procedures Within the Brigades 
 As noted in the JCIET 2000 evaluation, if imagery reporting procedures are not 
worked out before integrating the TUAV system into Brigade operations, there is a real 
danger of multiple and/or contradictory report generation. Reports originating from the 
TUAV GCS should not present problems. The standardized procedures recommended in 
the TUAV Concept of Operations breaks requests for information into two types – 
planned and immediate. Figure 41 graphically displays the flow from the requestor 




Figure 41. TUAV Tasking and Reporting [From: Ref. 8] 
 
This standardized tasking and reporting plan significantly reduces the risk of 
faulty reports when the loop is requestor-GCS-requestor. The risk of multiple or 
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contradictory reports is much higher, however, when the imagery reports are sent up from 
Brigade sub-units (e.g., a tank battalion headquarters that has an RVT available to it for a 
particular mission). The sub-units with the RVTs must supply organic personnel to man 
the RVT stations assigned to them. These soldiers are often untrained in imagery 
analyses.  Additionally, imagery reporting procedures within the sub-units are often non-
existent. What generally happens is someone who does not look too busy is grabbed and 
put into the seat as the imagery analyst.  
Unfortunately, most battalion-level staffs are undermanned in order to ensure 
their companies and platoons are fully stocked, so this soldier is not likely to be very 
senior or experienced.  Without proper training in both UAV imagery analyses and 
reporting procedures, several potential pitfalls exist – wrong (or no) identification of 
targets, imagery reports sent to the wrong person (or to no one), imagery reports not 
forwarded on the proper channel to the proper node, etc. 
A solution to the training end of the problem is for battalion-level staffs to 
identify and train two to three personnel as UAV imagery analysts. These personnel may 
have other assigned duties at the Battalion TOC, but in the event that an RVT is 
delegated to the unit, imagery analyses becomes their primary mission. The Brigade must 
also develop and train an internal reporting SOP for subordinate units manning RVTs – 
who do the RVT analysts report to within their own units, who at Brigade receives the 
“refined” reports from lower echelon units, etc. Candidates at the battalion-level to filter 
the RVT imagery reports are the S2 (or his assistant) and the Battle Captain. This person 




APPENDIX A.  SCENARIO 1 SIMULATION RESULTS 
This appendix displays the delays from each iteration of Scenario 1 in spreadsheet 
format. 
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6.028842 0.753605  
Iteration 1.1 Results 
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Iteration 1.2 Results 
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7.083566 0.885446  
Iteration 1.3 Results  
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4.665143 1.166286  
Iteration 1.5 Results 
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Iteration 1.6 Results 
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Iteration 1.7 Results 
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Iteration 1.8 Results  
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Iteration 1.9 Results 
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APPENDIX B.  SCENARIO 2 SIMULATION RESULTS 
This appendix displays the delays from each iteration of Scenario 2 in spreadsheet 
format. 
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Iteration 2.2 Result 
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Iteration 2.3 Results 
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Iteration 2.4 Results 
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Iteration 2.5 Results 
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Uplink Point # Sim Time Delay Total Avg
0 7.026087 0.079166  
1 147.0412 0.051864
0.13103 0.065515
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Downlink Point # Sim Time Delay Total Avg
0 127.3062 0.314039
1 138.9515 1.030513
1.344551 0.672276  
Iteration 2.8 Results 
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APPENDIX C.  SCENARIO 3 SIMULATION RESULTS 
This appendix displays the delays from each iteration of Scenario 3 in spreadsheet 
format. 
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Iteration 3.1 Results 
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Iteration 3.4 Results 
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Iteration 3.5 Results 
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Iteration 3.6 Results 
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0.878986 0.146498  
Iteration 3.7 Results 
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Iteration 3.8 Results 
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Iteration 3.9 Results 
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